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SME Policy and Firms’ Productivity in Latin America
* 
 
Very little is known about the effectiveness of SME policies, and a careful look at the 
structure, mechanisms and incentives provided by these policies suggest caution in their 
implementation and, most importantly, the need to carefully and closely monitor their results. 
This paper relies on the microeconometric analysis of a homogeneous dataset of sixteen 
Latin American and Caribbean countries to analyze the magnitude and determinants of the 
productivity gap between large and SME firms and to simulate of the impact on productivity of 
various policy scenarios. 
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1  Introduction 
In the last decades, governments have spent an increasing amount of resources in policies 
to support small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The extended use of these policies may 
be justified based on some of the challenges that SMEs face and that could hinder their 
productivity and growth. However, very little is known about the effectiveness of these 
policies, and a careful look at the structure, mechanisms and incentives provided by SME 
policies suggest caution in their implementation and, most importantly, the need to 
carefully and closely monitor their results.  
As in most public policies, strong opinions exist in favor and against SME support 
programs. On one hand, it has been argued that SMEs employ a large proportion of the 
population and therefore by subsidizing SMEs more employment will be created. It has also 
been argued that SME policies can promote growth and reduce poverty. Defenders of these 
policies argue that SMEs are more flexible, more dynamic, and more productive than large 
firms, even though they are usually constrained by specific market failures, which requires 
specific policies. On the other hand, detractors point out that these policies generate 
distortions that affect the allocation of resources and affect the size distribution of firms, 
and thus may have a negative effect on productivity. Also, those against the widespread use 
of SME policies point to the lack of documented results on the effectiveness of such 
interventions. 
The relationship between size and productivity is of particular interest in Latin America and 
Caribbean (LAC) countries. There is a wide consensus that the difference in the growth rate 
of the GDP per capita between LAC countries and the rest of western economies is due to 
low productivity growth rates (see Cole et al 2005). This fact, plus the fact that a large 
percentage of establishments are small but they account for a relatively small share of 
production, calls for a deeper understanding of the relationship between size and 
productivity and of the role played by SME policy in the region. 
In this paper we discuss the relationship between firm size and productivity in LAC and 
provide a framework to guide the analysis of the rationale, structure and potential impacts 
of the SME policies on the aggregate level of productivity. This analytical framework 
assumes that SME policies might affect the aggregate level of productivity through two 
channels:  first, SME policies can affect aggregate productivity by directly influencing the 
productivity of SMEs; second, if SMEs and large firms differ in productivity (and there is 
ample evidence that they do significantly), SME policies can influence aggregate 
productivity through the reallocation of resources across SME and large firms.  
We perform three empirical exercises using comparable data for sixteen LAC countries. 
We first compare the productivity of SMEs with that of large firms. Second, we study how 
the variables that can be affected by SME policy such as training, access to credit, product 
innovation, and ISO certification affect the productivity gap. Finally, the third exercise   3
simulates the effect of several policy scenarios on the productivity of SMEs and aggregate 
productivity. 
We use plant level data for sixteen LAC countries from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(WBES) dataset. The principal advantage of WBES is that it provides homogeneous 
information for all the countries. The use of comparable micro data for all the countries is 
an important advantage with respect to previous studies in the region. Those studies used 
micro level data for only a small set of countries or aggregate data constructed from 
different sources that in many cases were not comparable between countries. In most of the 
LAC countries, WBES provides us with a cross-section of plants for the period 2006. 
However, for some countries the information is for the period 2003 and for a reduced group 
of countries 2003 and 2006. Because of the lack of panel data information, we estimate 
plant’s productivity using non-parametric techniques that assume constant returns to scale 
(CRS). This assumption can be problematic when comparing firms of different scale. To 
overcome this limitation we analyze the robustness of our results by considering different 
values of the parameter of returns to scale. As an additional robustness check, we estimate 
the production function without assuming CRS. This would be the preferred method but 
with cross-section data it is hard to find proper instruments for the inputs.  
The findings reported here show that, as expected, large enterprises tend to be more 
productive than SMEs. On the determinants of this productivity gap, some key associated 
factors are the different levels of use of credit, use of training, intensity of innovation and 
quality certification, all variables related to firms’ acquisition of improved technologies 
Unfortunately, data constraints precludes distinguishing whether the positive correlation 
between productivity and these factors is driven by selection of more productive firms into 
these activities or whether it reflects the effect of these activities on the productivity of 
SMEs. Finally, a micro-simulation analysis shows that properly targeted SME policies 
might have a significant positive effect on aggregate productivity, mostly because of 
reallocation of resources toward more productive firms. However, the results of the 
simulation also suggest that the same policies not specifically targeted at SMEs, but applied 
to all firms, might produce a higher increase of aggregate productivity. 
The main contribution of this study to the literature on SMEs and productivity in LAC is to 
systematically reexamine the topics for a large number of LAC countries using a consistent 
methodology and comparable data. This work is related to Van Biesebroeck (2005) who 
studied growth and productivity growth in African manufacturing with particular focus on 
firms’s size. For LAC countries the evidence is scarce and mainly focused in few countries 
(Peres and Stumpo, 2000; Liedholm, 2002; Alvarez and Crespi, 2003, OECD 2007, and 
Goldberg and Palladini, 2007). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the objectives, rationale, 
and instruments of the SME policy. It also presents a review some of the SME policies 
applied in LAC countries. Section 3 presents the relationship between firm size and 
productivity.  Section 4 presents the dataset. Section 5 presents evidence on the 
productivity gap between SMEs and large firms. Section 6 discusses the determinants of the 
gap. Section 7 simulates several policy scenarios. Section 8 discusses the evidence on the 
effectiveness of the SME policy. Finally, section 9 concludes.   4
2  The SME Sector and SME Policies: Objectives, Rationale, 
and Instruments  
2.1  The SME sector in Latin America and the Caribbean 
The relative size of the SME sector varies across countries and it is an endogenous 
characteristic of each country. The endowment of natural resources, technology, policies, 
and institutions help determine a nation’s industrial composition and optimal firm size. For 
instance, some countries may have endowments that give the country a comparative 
advantage in the production of goods that are produced efficiently in large firms, while 
other countries may have a comparative advantage in goods produced more efficiently in 
small firms (You, 1995). Similarly, countries that are open to international trade may have 
larger optimal firm size than countries that are less integrated internationally (Caves et al. 
1980). In addition, the firm size distribution can also be affected by economic policy. For 
example, simplified tax regimes for SMEs may affect their incentives to grow, as firms may 
not find it profitable to move to the standard tax regime. 
International comparisons of the size of the SME sector are affected by the particular 
definition of SME. SMEs are those firms with a quantitative measure, e.g. number of 
employees, lower than a certain threshold. However, not all the countries use the same 
quantitative measure. Moreover, those that use the same quantitative measure do not 
necessarily use the same threshold. The quantitative measures used LAC countries include 
number of employees, sales, assets, and a combination of these criteria. The most 
commonly criteria used to define SMEs are number of employees and monthly or annual 
sales. In general, the upper limit of the number of employees used in the SME definition in 
LAC countries is lower than in EU countries and US. The exceptions are the manufacturing 
sectors in Brazil with a limit of 500 –equal to the one in US- and Mexico with a limit of 
250 employees –equal of the one in the EU.
4 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
As shown in Table 1, the largest fraction of small firms is composed of very small firms, 
those with less than five or ten employees, and that constitute the “micro” firms in the 
context of the MSME sector. Because data constraints our empirical analysis focuses on the 
SME sector, namely those with five or more employees. 
                                                 
4  According with the EU definition, a SME is a non-subsidiary and independent firm that employs less 
than 250 employees and has an annual turnover lower than EUR 50 millions or an annual balance sheet lower 
than EUR 43 millions.   5
2.2  SME Policies and Instruments 
SME policies are those targeted at firms below a certain size. With this broad definition, a 
wide range of policies falls in this category. In general, almost all LAC countries have a 
simplified tax regime or differential labor regulations for SMEs, as well as programs to 
facilitate access to credit and a set of subsidies and services aimed at supporting SMEs in 
different aspects of their activities. This chapter centers on those policies aimed at 
increasing firms’ productivity, most often through the promotion of training, innovation, 
and quality certification. Although access to credit has been analyzed in another chapter of 
the report, it will also be discussed here as it is an instrument widely adopted in SME 
policies. 
Most of SME policies mention as their goal the achievement of higher rates of economic 
growth and the reduction of poverty.
5 However, they often have other objectives, such as 
employment, in addition to the two ones mentioned. In general those objectives are not 
clearly specified. Additionally, when designing and implementing SME policies, policy 
makers are often faced with restrictions and incentives that go beyond concerns about 
market failures, and that are more related to political cycles, equality, and other concepts in 
the realm of political economy. These features should be acknowledged when examining 
the coherence of SME interventions. 
From an economic point of view, there are two broad sets of justifications for SME 
policies. The main economic justification is the existence of market failures that might stunt 
growth of SMEs, which in turn can lead to lower aggregate growth. In this context, public 
interventions targeted at SMEs are justified in terms of addressing market failures that 
affect SME, such as asymmetric and/or incomplete information, non-convexities, and local 
externalities.  For instance in the financial market, banks often fail to accurately assess the 
risk of lending to SME and therefore reject some profitable projects and compromise the 
survival and growth of many promising firms. Therefore, by removing information 
asymmetries that preclude access to financing, economic policy may enhance the growth of 
the most efficient firms and a net gain in terms of productivity. In some cases owners of 
small firms do not have information on the private benefits of taking certain courses of 
action, e.g., offering training to their employees or obtaining external advice from 
specialists or consultant, illustrating instances of incomplete information. In other cases, 
those actions are not taken because of scale problems, suggesting failures related to 
indivisibilities and non-convexities. In this context, SME efficiency may be constrained by 
the incapacity or unwillingness of crucial suppliers to scale down their services to meet the 
demand of smaller firms. The most common example is perhaps the provision of small 
loans by credit institutions, but the concept could be expanded to several services that 
imply an initial assessment of the costumer needs and characteristics (such, for instance, 
technical assistance and training). In these cases, the fixed costs of providing the services 
do not significantly decrease with the size of the clients, while the revenues decrease 
significantly, making the provision of services to smaller firms highly unprofitable. This 
                                                 
5 See Ayyagari et al. (2007).   6
argument has frequently been used to justify public policies that aim at supporting the 
coordination efforts that the SMEs need to undertake in order to organize a joint demand 
for services. Associativity, networking and clustering policies, for instance, have often been 
justified for this reason, among others.
6  
The other set of justifications for SME policies relate to the (presumed or real) 
characteristics of SMEs that are deemed particularly desirable. First, it is argued that SMEs 
enhance competition and entrepreneurship and hence have external benefits on economy-
wide efficiency, innovation, and aggregate productivity growth. These externalities would 
justify public support to SMEs. Second, SMEs are portrayed as labor-intensive, thus an 
expansion of the SME sector would boost employment more than an expansion of large 
firms. Finally, proponents claim that SMEs may be efficient firms in an early stage of 
development, whose growth is constrained by institutional failures that favor large firms.    
There are also skeptical views questioning the efficacy of SME support policies. First, 
some authors stress the advantages of large firms, for example, arguing that large firms 
benefit from economies of scale and create more stable and higher quality jobs. Second, 
some research finds that SMEs are neither more labor intensive, nor better at job creation 
than large firms. Third, other authors question the validity of considering firm size as an 
exogenous determinant of economic growth. According with this view, pro-SME subsidies 
could actually distort firm size and potentially hurt economic efficiency. A fourth critic 
view stresses the importance of improving the business environment for all size of firms. 
Low entry and exit barriers, well defined property rights, and effective contract 
enforcement characterize a business environment that is conducive to competition and 
private commercial transactions. While these factors may encourage SMEs, the focus of the 
business environment view is not on SMEs per se; it is on the environment facing all 
businesses. Finally, a fifth skeptical view of SME policy (Levine, 2005) argues that these 
policies are probably most needed where they are less likely to succeed: if SME face 
institutional obstacles due to some sort of regulatory capture, it is very likely that SME 
programs will also be captured.   
Although this debate is far from reaching any consensus, as a matter of fact many LAC 
Governments have over time introduced an increasingly complex set of SME policies. 
Figure 1 summarizes some SME policies applied in Latin America aggregated in terms of 
the variable they aim to affect. The instruments commonly used by the SME policy are 
credit, matching grants, technical assistance, and fiscal incentives. One important 
characteristic of the SME policy is that there are many programs and it is not possible to 
                                                 
6 The emergence of highly competitive clusters and industrial districts – often composed by SMEs or by 
combinations of large firms and small providers – has introduced new justifications for policies targeted at 
SMEs. In this case, the local concentration of SMEs specialized in a specific production has been seen as a 
potentially efficient combination of production scale and flexibility, which, however, requires again important 
coordination efforts by the firms involved in rather complex production systems. In this case, specific policies 
have been advocated to support the process through which SMEs identify and finance joint activities aimed at 
improving the cluster systemic efficiency and at dealing with local externalities (for examples on LAC, see 
Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2004).   7
include all of them in one figure and therefore some countries and policies were selected.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
3  The relationship between size and productivity 
SME Policy affects the aggregate level of productivity through two channels.  First, SME 
policies can affect aggregate productivity by directly influencing the productivity of SMEs 
and, thus, the productivity gap between SMEs and large firms. Second, if SME and large 
firms differ in productivity, SME policies can influence aggregate productivity through the 
reallocation of resources across SME and large firms. 
The empirical framework below decomposes aggregate productivity in a country into these 
two channels.  The framework takes into account that SMEs might be more or less 
productive than large firms and that aggregate productivity also depends on how resources 
are allocated between these two groups of firms. Therefore it is thus well suited to examine 
the importance of SMEs for aggregate productivity through these two channels. 








ω ,         ( 1 )  
where  it P  and  it ω  are the market share and the productivity level of firm i in period t. The 
market share is given by the ratio between firm i’s sales  it Y and the total sales  t Y  defined as 
the sum of firms’s sales in period t. For simplicity we are currently performing productivity 
decomposition for the economy as a whole without focusing on firms' industry affiliation.
7 
We are interested in evaluating the impact of the SME Policy, so we can decompose  t P  into 
productivity contribution attributed to SME firms and large firms as follows  
arg
t i ti t i ti t
iS M E iL e
PP P ωω
∈∈
=+ ∑∑ .        ( 2 )  
This expression can be written as 
                                                 
7 When different industries are considered this should be done by industry and after that the data needs to be 
weighted by the industry shares. This point is important when working with sample data. In a stratified 
random sample, all population units are grouped within homogeneous groups and simple random samples are 
selected within each group. This method allows computing estimates for each of the strata with a specified 
level of precision while population estimates can also be estimated by properly weighting individual 
observations.   8
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Given that  ,a r g , 1 SME t L e t ω ω += , 
( ) arg , , , arg , t L e t SME t SME t L e t PP P P ω =+ − .      (3) 
This expression clearly shows that the level of productivity depends on the level of 
aggregate productivity of each size group and the contribution to aggregate production of 
the SME sector. Therefore, changes in the aggregate level of productivity ( t P ) can result 
from changes in the productivity of each size group (i.e., changes in  , SME t P  and  t e L P , arg ) or 
changes in the allocation of resources between size groups (i.e., changes in  , SME t ω ). Policies 
aiming to support SME may affect both  , SME t P  and  , SME t ω .  
The impact on aggregate productivity induced by changes in the productivity of each size 
group is clear: aggregate productivity will be higher if there is an increase in the 
productivity of the small or large firms. However, an increase in the share of the SME 
sector will only increase aggregate productivity if SME firms tend to be more productive 
than large firms. Most of the existing evidence suggests that, on average, large firms have 
higher total factor productivity.
8 If SME are less productive than larger firms, policies 
aiming to increase the proportion of the SME sector (e.g. employment policies) without 
increasing its productivity may have a negative impact on aggregate productivity.  
This framework thus indicates that it is important to consider the reallocation and direct 
productivity channel when discussion policy options for SMEs.  If SME are less productive 
than larger firms, policies aiming to increase the proportion of the SME sector (e.g. 
employment policies) without increasing its productivity may have a negative long run 
impact on aggregate productivity. In this context, aggregate productivity could be at least in 
principle be improved by SME policies that increase the productivity of the SME sector, 
, SME t P  and that do not simultaneously reduce productivity of large firms.  
4  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We use plant level data from The World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES). The surveys 
                                                 
8 For example, Söderbom and Teal, 2004 find that SMEs are more productive in Africa, while Van 
Biesebroeck, 2005, also for Africa, reaches the opposite conclusion; other relevant papers are Alvarez and 
Crespi, 2003 for Chile; and Diaz and Sanchez, 2008, for Spain.   9
are applied to a representative sample of firms in the non-agricultural economy and cover 
plants with more than five employees. The sample includes manufacturing, services, 
transport, construction sectors. However, only manufactures has been surveyed in all LAC 
countries and therefore we restrict our analysis to the manufacturing sector. The 
information for the majority of countries was surveyed in 2006. However, there are some 
countries with information for 2003 and others with information for 2003 and 2006.  
The principal advantage of this dataset is that it provides homogeneous information for 
sixteen LAC countries.
9 Surveys are designed in the same way, with similar questionnaire 
structure and follow similar sampling frames.
10 This is important advantage with respect to 
previous studies that present evidence only for a small set of countries.  
WBES provides us with the necessary information to estimate Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) at the plant level. It also provides information about the firm (ownership, other 
plants, organization) and some characteristics of the plant (age, etc) and a set of variables 
that can be modified by SME policy, such as access to credit, training, and process 
innovation. See Appendix A for the list of variables we were able to match across all the 
surveys. 
The datasets have two limitations. First, all the plants in the dataset belong to formal firms 
with more than 5 employees. As mentioned in section 2, this is important because in LAC 
economies a large proportion of employment takes place in micro and informal firms. 
Unfortunately, there is no dataset covering informal or micro firms for all the considered 
countries. The second limitation is that the surveys do not provide us with panel data 
information. The lack of panel data limits our ability to control for the endogeneity of both 
inputs and productivity determinants.  
The log of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of firm i is given by pi 
  iil im ik i p yl mk α αα = −− − , (4) 
where y, l, m, and k are the log value of sales, log number of hours worked per year by 
temporary and permanent workers, the log value of materials and the log value of capital, 
respectively. In all the surveys monetary variables are in local currency units (LCUs) and 
were converted into US dollars. 
Because of the lack of panel data, we estimate the input-output elasticities ( , , lmk α αα ) by 
the cost share of each input.
11 An important assumption behind this estimation procedure is 
                                                 
9 The countries are Argentina (2006), Bolivia (2006), Brazil (2003), Chile (2004, 2006), Colombia (2006), 
Costa Rica (2005), Ecuador (2006), El Salvador (2003, 2006), Guatemala (2003, 2006), Honduras (2003, 
2006), Mexico (2006), Nicaragua (2003, 2006), Panama (2006), Paraguay (2006), Peru (2006), and Uruguay 
(2006). 
10  The sampling frame in 2006 is different than the sampling frame in previous years. In 2006 there was 
stratified sapling. 
11 Alternatively, the input-output elasticities can be obtained by estimating the production function.   10
the presence of constant returns to scale (CRS) at the industry level. This assumption can be 
problematic in our case because our objective is to compare the productivity of firms of 
different size and therefore the scale is the relevant dimension. If the CRS assumption does 
not hold, the input-output elasticities have to be multiplied by the returns to scale parameter 
to obtain a measure of productivity.  
Under non-CRS, the log of productivity of firm i is given by 
  [ ] ii l im ik i p yl m k γα α α =− + + , (5) 
whereγ  is the parameter of the returns to scale. The comparison of productivity between 
SMEs and large firms is affected by the returns to scale parameter. Suppose for simplicity 
that i = S, L (i.e. we only have two firms; one small and one large). The difference in 
productivity between these two firms is given by 
  ()( ) ( ) ( ) LS LS l L S m LS k L S p py y l l m m k k γα α α ⎡⎤ −= − − −+ − + − ⎣⎦ . (6) 
When there is increasing returns to scale (IRS) (i.e.  1 γ > ) the assumption of CRS (i.e. 
1 γ = ) introduces a bias in favor of large firms. On the other hand, when there is decreasing 
returns to scale (DRS) (i.e.  1 γ < ) the assumption of CRS introduces a bias in favor of small 
firms.
 12  
5  The productivity gap between SMEs and large firms 
The economic theory does not provide an answer to the question regarding the relative 
productivity of SMEs with respect to large firms. On the one hand, large firms may take 
advantage of economies of scale and scope and more easily undertake some fixed costs. On 
the other hand, small firms may have higher flexibility to face changes in their 
environment, they may use cooperation to achieve economies of scale and scope similar to 
those of larger firms; or they may simply focus on small and highly specialized markets. 
In this section we compare the productivity distribution of SMEs with that of large firms. 
To compare the productivity of firms in different industries in this section we use a 
productivity index that measures the proportional difference of TFP for firm i relative to a 
reference firm that varies across industries (Caves, Christensen and Diewert, 1982).  For a 
given industry j, the firm of reference is defined as the firm that has: (i) its output is equal 
                                                                                                                                                     
Unfortunately, without panel data information it is difficult to control for the endogeneity of the inputs (See 
Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinshon and Petrin, 2003; and Ackerberg et al 2007). 
12 For robustness in the empirical analysis that follows we allowed the scale parameter to vary from 0.8 to 1.2, 
and the results did not change significantly. We also estimated the production function ignoring the 
endogeneity of the inputs. The estimation rejects the CRS assumption in favor of IRS. However, the value of 
the returns to scale parameter is not far from 1; it lies between 1.03 and 1.05 depending on the industry   11
to the geometric mean of firm’s output quantities in industry j over the entire period; (ii) the 
quantities of inputs are equal to the geometric means of firms input quantities in industry j 
over the entire period; and (iii) the cost shares of inputs are equal to the arithmetic mean of 
firms cost shares in industry j. Therefore, when observations of different industries are 
pooled, productivity differences among industries are removed. If firm i belongs to the 
industry j, then its productivity index (in logs) is given by  















∑  (7) 
where x= l (labor), m (materials), k (capital); j=1,2,…, J (number of industries); and for a 
generic variable zi  which can be  i y  (sales), or xi ;  j z  is the average value of z for the firms 
in industry j. Averages are computed within each country, therefore each country has its 
own reference firm for each industry. 
With the TFP index defined in (7) it is possible to pool all the observations within each 
country and to compare the productivity distribution of SMEs and the productivity 
distribution of large firms. Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the 
productivity index in (7) of SMEs and large firms in selected countries. In Brazil, Mexico, 
Costa Rica and Panama, the cdf of large firms is at the right of the cdf of small firms 
indicating stochastic dominance. On the other hand, in Argentina and Bolivia the difference 
is not clear. Hence, these results indicate that large firms tend to be more productive than 
SMEs, although the evidence is less clear cut in Argentina and Bolivia. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
To summarize the information for all countries we use the relative distribution function, 
R.
13 This distribution allows us to compare a distribution G with a reference distribution F. 
The relative distribution function is defined as  ( ) ( ) ( )
1 R rG Fr
− =  where 01 r ≤≤ . If both 
distributions are identical then R(r) is the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Figure 3 shows the 
relative distribution function for all the countries. 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The diagonal represents the uniform distribution, i.e., the relative distribution if both 
distributions were identical. The position of the relative distribution below the diagonal 
suggests that the distribution represented in the vertical axis stochastically dominates the 
distribution in the horizontal axis. 
With the exception of Argentina and Bolivia, all the distributions are below the diagonal 
indicating that the cdf of productivity in large firms stochastically dominates the cdf of 
                                                 
13 This function has been used by Delgado et al (2002) to compare the productivity cdf of exporters and non-
exporters.   12
SMEs. Again, this shows that large firms have higher productivity than small firms, except 
in Argentina and Bolivia were the results are not that clear. 
In light of this productivity gap showed in this section, policies that shift resources toward 
SME firms (without affecting firms' productivity), might have a negative effect on 
aggregate productivity because less productive firms would account for a larger share of 
economic activity.  
6  Understanding the productivity gap 
Is there any room for public policies in increasing the productivity of SME? The best way 
of answering this crucial question
14 would be to produce a significant number of studies on 
the impact of SME policies and their cost effectiveness, which means their effectiveness 
compared to other policy options. Unfortunately, such a set of studies has not been 
developed yet, and the rare evaluations that rigorously address this issue do not provide 
enough critical mass to draw significant conclusions. 
While policy makers, scholars and international agencies should drastically increase the 
resources devoted to impact evaluations of SME policies, other approaches should also be 
explored to have at least a glimpse on the adequacy of the SME policies. This section and 
the following are an attempt of doing that. We decompose the productivity gap in its major 
determinants, with particular attention to the variables usually targeted by SME policies, for 
instance access to credit, innovation, training and quality certification. Once the 
determinants of the productivity gap have been indentified and the relevance of the factors 
targeted by SME-policies has been tested, we simulate what would be the impact of 
expanding these policies on the productivity level.  
To study how the variables that can be affected by SME Policy affect productivity, we 
consider two procedures: (i) a linear regression model, and (ii) quasi-experimental 
techniques. 
In the first procedure we directly address the question of how much of the productivity gap 
can be explained by variables that can be affected by SME Policy. Let  i p  be the 
productivity of firm i defined in (4),  i S  a set of size dummies,  i X  a set of variables that can 
be affected by SME policy,  i Z  a set of exogenous control variables, and  ii CY ×  and  i I  a set 
of country-year and industry dummies. We run two regressions; one restricting the 
coefficient of the variables in  i X  to zero and other without any restriction. In these models 
we compare the coefficients of the size dummies and the difference in productivity by size 
category that can explain each model. The regressions are the following 
                                                 
14 Crucial because of the increasing amount of resources devoted to SME policies.   13
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The variables that we include as policy variables (variables that can be affected by SME 
policy) are training, credit, product innovation, ISO certification. The definition of these 
variables is as follows: (i) Training is a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm 
offers training to their employees, (ii) Credit is a dummy variable that takes value one if the 
firm reports that it has a credit line or overdraft facilities, (iii) Product innovation is a 
dummy variable that takes value one if the firm reported a product innovation in the last 
three years, (iv) ISO certification is a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm has 
ISO certification.  
These variables may result endogenous. Training is endogenous because it is likely that 
more productive firms offer training to their employees because they may be in a better 
financial position to do that. In the same way, credit is endogenous because it is possible to 
think that more productive firms are those that receive credit from financial institutions. 
To deal with the endogeneity of these variables we apply instrumental variables. We first 
consider as instrument the proportion of firms reporting training, credit, product innovation, 
and ISO certification in two clusters of firms: (i) firms in the same country and industry 
and, (ii) firms in the same industry and size category. That is, i.e., for each endogenous 
variable we consider two instruments. After testing the validity of those instruments, we 
consider adding as additional instruments the proportion of firms reporting training, credit, 
product innovation, and ISO certification in a cluster of firms in the same country, industry 
and size category. We test the validity of this extra set of instruments using the incremental 
Sargan test. The use of IV methods is warranted given the cross-section nature of the data; 
however the difficulty of finding appropriate instruments in this data calls for caution in the 
interpretation of results.  
With the set of variables in  i Z  we control for: (i) the age of the firm, (ii) the organizational 
form of the firm –we include dummies for incorporated companies, firms with only one 
establishment, and firms with only one proprietary, (iii) the level of unionization in the 
industry and size, (iv) the business cycle –we use the average at the country-industry level 
of the capacity utilization, and (v) the level of formality of the firm –we include an average 
at the country-industry-size level of the manager’s time dealing with bureaucracy. 
With respect to the business cycle we expect a positive relationship because the literature 
has found that productivity is pro-cyclical. We average across country-industry to capture 
the business cycle and avoid considering inefficiencies by firm.  
We define the level of formality as the manager’s time dealing with bureaucracy because it 
is sensible to expect that the more formal the firm is the more time the manager needs to 
allocate in dealing with bureaucracy. We take the average across country-industry-size to 
avoid confusions with efficiency in dealing with bureaucracy at the firm level.   14
Table 2 shows the result of the estimation of equations (6.1) and (6.2). We did two different 
exercises with different definitions of size. First, we consider three size categories –with 
large firms being the excluded group. Table 2 shows the results as Discrete Size. Second, 
we consider the number of employees –Continuous Size in Table 2.
15 In both cases, we 
estimated (6.2) by OLS and 2SLS. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 shows a large gap in productivity between SMEs and large firms. On average, 
small firms are 22% less productive than large firms and medium-sized firms are 15% less 
productive than large firms. When the regression includes the variables in  i X  the estimated 
coefficient on size –both in the discrete and continuous case- is lower. In the OLS columns 
the estimated coefficients on the size variables are lower but continue to be significant. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients on size in the 2SLS regressions are substantially lower and 
no longer statistically significant. 
With respect to the variables that can be affected by SME Policy, access to credit, training 
and ISO certification show positive and significant coefficients. On the other hand, product 
innovation shows no significant coefficients when estimating by OLS and positive and 
significant coefficient only in the 2SLS estimation. This non robust result of product 
innovation can be reflecting the fact that the innovation needs time to produce an increase 
in productivity.  
Table 2 also shows other interesting results. First, more formal firms are more productive. 
Second, firms with a larger the proportion of unionized workers have lower productivity. 
Third, the sign of the rest of variables is as expected; productivity is pro-cyclical, older 
firms are more productive, incorporated companies are more productive and one 
establishment and one proprietary firm are less productive. 
What is interesting to note is that the difference in productivity is present even when the 
coefficient of size is smaller. Given that the coefficient of the policy variables is the same 
for small, medium-sized and large firms, the difference in productivity across size is 
explained by the difference in the variables that can be affected by SME policy. Figure 4 
shows the average productivity by size category obtained by the predicted values of 
equations (6.1) and (6.2) and the average by size of the variables that can be affected by 
SME policy.  
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
As mentioned above, both OLS and 2SLS results go in the same direction in the sense that 
when including policy variables there is a reduction in the size coefficients. However, the 
difference between the OLS and 2SLS coefficients is large. When estimating by 2SLS, the 
                                                 
15 We also considered the number of employees the plant had three years before. By considering the size the 
plant had three years before, we avoid the possible endogeneity that can appear if most productive firms are 
those that grow and increase their size. Results were robust.    15
coefficients of the size variables become statistically insignificant and the magnitudes of 
the estimated coefficients on policy variables increase considerably. However, even when 
the instruments pass the statistical tests for being considered good instruments, the way in 
which they have been constructed may cast doubts on the 2SLS estimates and the 
endogeneity of the policy variables on the OLS results.  
Given the inherent problems with OLS and 2SLS, we propose another exercise to obtain 
the impact of the variables that can be affected by SME policy on plant’s productivity. For 
each one of those variables we evaluate their impact on productivity applying standard 
methods proposed in the treatment effect literature.  
The starting point is the estimation of the treatment effect, which for each participant is 
defined as 
  10 iii YY α = −  (7) 
In other words, the impact is the difference in the outcome (Y) depending on whether the 
firm participated in the program ( 1i Y ) or did not participate ( 0i Y ). In our case participation 
means, depending on the case, providing training, having access to credit, having ISO 
certification, or innovating. 
The fundamental problem of evaluation is that, for any given individual i, it is impossible to 
observe both  1i Y  and 0i Y  simultaneously. For participants, we are interested in 
() 10 |1 ii i i YY T α =− = , but for them it is impossible to observe ( 0i Y ). 
For the population of beneficiaries we are interested in the average impact of the program 
() ( ) ( ) 10 1 0 |1 |1 |1 ii i i i i i GE YYT E YT E YT =−= = = − = , and we need to estimate 
() 0 |1 ii EY T= , the counterfactual of what would the productivity be if the plant that, for 
example, offer training to their employees would not has offered such a training. The 
general approach is to approximate  ( ) 0 |1 ii EY T= with  ( ) 0 |0 ii EY T=  using a comparison 
group, which is formed by plants similar to the one that offered training that did not offered 
training –and the same for the rest of variables. 
The impact evaluation must rest on an adequate and rigorous strategy for identifying a 
statistically robust control group of non-beneficiaries. A central issue is how to create a 
valid comparison group, in the sense that the differences in the productivity between 
participants and non-participants are explained by the program and not by other 
characteristics. The ideal solution is to have the treatment randomly assigned, in order to 
guarantee that on average the characteristics of both groups are the same. In the absence of 
this solution, we aim at identifying individuals that have the same observable relevant 
characteristics as the participants through matching methodologies. This assumes that the 
selection of firms into the treatment occurs only through observables, and there is no 
systematic sorting into treatment based on unobservable firm characteristics. 
  The procedure is as follows: First, we estimate the probability of participation,   16
1 ˆ(, , ,) ii i i i p SZ C YI × , by estimating the propensity score 
  () ( )
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the variables in vectors  i S ,  ii CY × ,and  i I  have been defined previously defined. The vector 
1i Z  is a subset of  i Z . Summarizing, the observable characteristics we consider are age, the 
organizational form of the firm (incorporated companies, firms with only one 
establishment, and firms with only one proprietary), industry, and country-year. 
The propensity score is computed for all individuals, those that participated and those that 
did not participate. The next step involves using matching techniques to compare the 
productivity of each participant with the productivity of nonparticipants that have similar 
probability of participation. The general form of the matching estimator is: 
 
















∑ ∑  (9) 
where  1 n is the number of treated and w(i,  j) represents the weight given to the jth 
observation when constructing the counterfactual for the ith treated observation. 
Table 3 shows the results for each of the variables that can be affected by SME Policy for 
all the firms and considering separately SMEs and large firms. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The results not only show a consistent and robust relationship between access to credit, 
training and quality certification and productivity, but also that the relevance of the policy 
variables is higher in the case of SMEs than larger firms (except in access to credit). It is 
interesting to note that the magnitude of the impact lies between the one obtained by OLS 
and 2SLS in Table 2. 
In sum, the regression analysis above suggests that smaller and medium sized firms are on 
average less productive than larger firms.  This confirms the finding of the productivity gap 
between large and small firms in section 5.  Further analysis suggests that the productivity 
differences between SMEs and larger firms could be in part driven by differential 
participation of these firms in worker training, credit availability, product innovation and 
ISO certification; all variables that in principle can be affected by SME Policy. Given the 
lack panel data, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that the positive association between 
training, credit availability, etc. and productivity does not simply reflect selection of 
inherently better firms into these programs or reverse causality, whereby more productive 
firms have easier access to credit or can afford worker training.  If self-selection or reverse 
causality drives the positive association between training and productivity, then providing 
SME firms with access to credit or training might not necessarily lead to productivity 
improvements in SME firms. We attempt to address these concerns by using 2SLS and   17
propensity score matching and continue to find support for the above results.  Nonetheless, 
given the structure of our data and strong identification assumption behind these techniques 
the concerns about the interpretation of results continue to exist.  
Do these results imply that SME policies are justified? Even taking the results at face value, 
one should not jump to the conclusion that SME policies aimed at improving access to 
credit, promoting training, innovation, and increasing quality certification would 
necessarily have a positive effect on the overall productivity level, as it is not evident that 
policies would actually induce the beneficiary firms to engage in those activities that have a 
positive relationship with productivity – for instance it may be that firms that participate in 
a training program would have trained their workers anyway with their own resources. 
Also, the type of activities promoted with public policies is not necessarily the same type as 
those that implemented by firms on their own – for instance the training provided by SME 
programs may differ substantially from the training provided by the most productive firms. 
7  The effect of SME Policy via simulations  
In this section we combine the methods used in previous section to simulate the effect of 
several policies on firms’s productivity. We use the reduced form estimates to evaluate the 
impact of changes in access to credit, training, product innovation and ISO certification on 
firms’s productivity and the propensity score to select the firms that will be receiving the 
policy, i.e., we use the propensity score as a targeting rule. With the targeting rule we aim 
at promoting those activities among firms that have not yet implemented them, but that 
have similar observable characteristics to the ones that have.  
We are interested in two questions: (i) How much of the productivity gap can be closed by 
an SME policy? and (ii) Which is the effect on the aggregate level of productivity? 
7.1  The effect on the productivity gap 
We compare two policy designs: 
(i)  SME Policy 1: SME Policy targets those SMEs that are not training their 
workers but have a propensity score higher than 0.5.  We do the same for credit, 
product innovation, and ISO certification. 
(ii)  SME Policy 2: SME Policy targets those SMEs that have the highest propensity 
score of training and are not offering training. In this case, we select firms 
according their propensity score up to the point where the fraction of SMEs that 
engage in training is similar to the fraction of large firms that train. We do the 
same for credit, product innovation, and ISO certification. 
To obtain the productivity level of firm i in the baseline, 
BL
i p , and under policy SP, 
SP
i p , 
(with SP=training, credit, product innovation, and ISO certification) we use equation (6.2).   18
Then, the productivity of firm i in the baseline is 
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and under policy SP is 
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where 
SP
i X  is the vector corresponding to the simulated policy.  
In our case, all the variables that can be affected by SME Policy are dummy variables and 
therefore the simulation is computationally simple; it just implies changing zeros by ones in 
the “policy variables” for those firms receiving the policy. As mentioned above, the rule for 
assigning the policy is important. Not all the firms the firms that do not offer training to 
their employees (or are not innovating, etc) receive the policy in the simulation exercise; 
only those firms that satisfies the conditions described above. Therefore, 
SP
i X  is equal to 
i X  except for those firms that were selected to participate in the policy. We do the exercise 
policy by policy and therefore 
SP
i X  differs from  i X only in the activity considered by the 
policy.  
Figure 5 shows the distribution of productivity of SMEs and large firms under both 
scenarios.  
[FIGURE 5 ABOVE HERE] 
7.2  The effect on the aggregate level of productivity 
In order to address the skeptic view that productivity policies should not be targeted 
exclusively or primarily to SMEs we consider how the aggregate level of productivity 
would increase under two scenarios: one in which policy is targeted by size (SME Policy) 
and other one with non-targeted by size policy. The simulated policy designs are as follows 
(i)  SME Policy 1 of previous subsection. 
(ii)  Non-Targeted by Size: Policy targets firms with the highest propensity score of 
training and not currently offering training. We select firms up to the point were 
the number of firms starting to train their workers is equal to the number of 
firms starting to train their workers in policy design (i). The same for credit, 
innovation, and ISO certification. 
Let 
BL
i p  and 
BL
i w  be the productivity and the output-share of firm i in the baseline. Then 









i p  and 
SP
i w  be the productivity and output share of firm i in the simulated policy 
design SP, with SP being training, credit, product innovation and ISO certification. Then 
the change in the aggregate level of productivity due to policy SP can be decomposed 
following Foster et al (1998) as follows: 
    ()
SP BL BL BL
ii i i i i
ii i
Pw pp P ww p ∆= ∆ + − ∆ + ∆ ∆ ∑∑ ∑ , 
where 
SP BL
ii i p pp ∆= −  and 
SP BL
ii i ww w ∆= − . 
The first term is the increase in aggregate productivity when firms increase their 
productivity at baseline market share (the within-plant term). The second term is the 
increase in productivity resulting when plants with above-average productivity expand their 
market share relative to plants with below-average productivity (the between-plant term). 
The third term is the cross-plant term. 
The productivity level of firm i in the baseline and under policy SP are defined above. To 
obtain the change in market shares we use the production function.
16 Then the value of 
output and market shares after policy SP are given by
17 
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Table 4 shows the results of this simulation. The results show that properly targeted SME 
policies might have a significant positive effect on aggregate productivity – in the sample 
adopted for the simulation, they would induce a 5.7 percent aggregate productivity increase 
(when all policies are performed simultaneously). The overall effect on aggregate 
productivity is mostly due to the “between-firms” term, which accounts for 65 percent of 
the aggregate productivity increase, while the “within-firm” term accounts for 45 percent 
aggregate productivity increase.  
                                                 
16 Similar approach was proposed by Escribano et al (2008) to obtain the market shares in a simulation on the 
impact of the investment climate on the components of the Olley and Pakes decomposition. 
17 We are considering only the direct change in output due to changes in productivity. The input demand 
functions are also function of productivity and therefore the output is also affected by changes in inputs 
induced by the productivity change. For simplicity, we are ignoring those changes.   20
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
In the case of Non-Targeted by Size Policy, the simulation shows that the overall impact on 
aggregate productivity would be much higher than in the previous case, with a 10.5 percent 
overall impact on aggregate productivity. The decomposition of this effect is also quite 
different that in the previous case. In fact, most of the impact on productivity is due to the 
“within-firms” term, which accounts for 81 percent of the increase. This is clearly due to 
the fact that non-SME-targeted policies would affect the productivity of firms with larger 
initial market share, increasing the importance of the contribution of the “within-effect”. 
8  Evidence on the effectiveness of SME Policy from impact 
evaluations 
As mention before, a large set of rigorous impact evaluations would be extremely beneficial 
for previous discussion on the effect of SME policies on aggregate productivity. 
Unfortunately, in Latin America and the Caribbean SME policies have not been properly 
evaluated. Most policies are not even properly monitored, and a rigorous analysis of their 
results in terms of fostering the growth and productivity of SMEs is missing. Although 
large sums of resources are invested in SME policies
18, the information of the results of 
these policies is nil. A recent overview of SME policies in Peru, for example, shows that of 
the eighteen most important programs, only one has a monitoring and evaluation 
component (although a rigorous evaluation has not taken place). The same study (Diaz and 
Jaramillo, 2009) reports that SME policies in Peru are characterized by being spread too 
thin: policies and programs exist to work on a wide range of issues related to SMEs. 
However another characteristic is that these policies lack a diagnosis that would allow them 
to solve specific problems faced by SMEs, and the third feature is that the coverage of SME 
policies is extremely low.  
In Mexico, since 2000 Congress required annual evaluations of all public projects managed 
by the federal government and that involved subsidies or transfers. Hence, many SME 
projects have been in principle evaluated. However, the quality of those evaluations is very 
low. A review of the most recent set of evaluations of SME projects show that in most of 
them, the monitoring and evaluation systems are not designed to gather information on 
results. 
19 In 2007, The World Bank published a study on the evaluation of SME policies in 
                                                 
18 In Mexico, for example, there are more than 140 programs that have as one of their objective to work with 
SMEs. The approximate resources spent in the largest twenty five of them is about US$3 billion (see Soto, 
2009), a figure similar to what the government spends in the CCT Oportunidades, that reaches 5 million 
families. 
19 See the process evaluations (Evaluación de Consistencia y Resultados) of 2007 of the National Evaluation 
Council (CONEVAL, www.coneval.gob.mx)   21
Mexico, and reported that only one program have had impact evaluations using comparison 
groups and looking at intermediate and ultimate objectives The results of those impact 
evaluations suggest “that SME programs influence intermediate outcomes, including 
training and technology adoption… the measurement of positive program impacts on final 
outcomes [improved performance, productivity, wages and export orientation] remains 
elusive.”
20 The conclusions of the study for Mexico are similar than those posed for Chile 
by Goldberg and Palladini (2008), in that a comprehensive system to monitor and evaluate 
these programs is required. 
In Colombia, the shortage of impact evaluations of programs that support SME is also 
apparent. One exception is the evaluation of job training programs administered by SENA, 
which were evaluated by Barrera and Corchuelo (2004) on the basis of the impact on 
workers compensation and not firm productivity, showing a positive effect on workers 
compensation. More recently, an impact evaluation of FOMIPYME, the main program to 
support the development of SME in the country, showed mixed results.  According to the 
evaluation, DNP (2008), the program had some positive impacts on employment and sales, 
but no impact on productivity.  However, the same document notes that the lack of a 
baseline and important data limitations are important caveats to interpreting the results of 
the evaluation as definitive.  In terms of export promotion, Volpe and Carballo (2008) find 
a positive impact of export promotion programs on export diversification, though 
presenting no results on productivity. 
In Argentina, the evaluation work has been focused on innovation programs. Binelli and 
Maffioli (2006) evaluate the PMT (Programa de Modernización Tecnológica), which 
provided matching grants to firms for the implementation of innovative practices. Results 
show important heterogeneity of impact, with more established firms, on average, using 
grants to displace innovation that they were already planning to undertake, whereas startup 
firms use the grants to finance innovation they otherwise would not have been able to 
undertake, generating an impact on innovation only on smaller firms. 
Hall and Maffioli (2008) present a survey of the evaluations of government Technology 
Development Funds (TDF) in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Panama. Four levels of potential 
impact were considered: (i) R&D input additionality , (ii) behavioural additionality, (iii) 
increases in innovative output, and (iv) improvements in performance. The evidence 
reported suggests that TDF do not crowd out private investment and that they positively 
affect R&D intensity. In addition, participation in TDF induces a more proactive attitude of 
beneficiary firms towards innovation activities. However, the analysis does not find much 
statistically significant impact on patents or new product sales and the evidence on firm 
performance is mixed, with positive results in terms of firm growth, but little corresponding 
positive impact on measures of firm productivity. This can be the result of the short horizon 
over which the evaluation was conducted.
21   
                                                 
20 See World Bank, 2007. Also for Mexico, see OECD (2007) and Storey (2008) for a review the evaluation 
of SME support programs in Mexico. 
21 Other papers on the evaluation of Science and Technology Programs are Binelli and Maffioli (2007) and   22
Looking to other developing countries outside LAC, there have been illustrative 
experiences on SME training programs, particularly in South Korea. In that country, several 
models of financial incentives to firms to promote training were implemented without 
success. However, when SMEs were given institutional and technical assistance the results 
were positive, both in terms of the involvement of firms and on the productivity of firms. 
This experience also documents the need for an integrated SME policy, not only in terms of 
instruments (technical assistance, subsidies) but also in terms of working with groups of 
SMEs and in alignment with business organizations.
22  
9  Concluding Remarks 
Do SME policies improve productivity in Latin America and the Caribbean? Sadly, the 
enormous enthusiasm that governments and international agencies have shown towards 
financing SME policies and promoting the growth and development of the SME sector has 
not been accompanied by a similar eagerness to track the results and measure the impacts 
of such policies. This worrisome reality is not limited to the productivity dimension: overall 
it is not clear if firms that have benefited from SME programs have in fact survived more or 
generated more employment than what would have taken place in the absence of such 
programs. Hence, it is unknown whether SME policies contribute to productivity.  
Can SME policies improve productivity in Latin America and the Caribbean? In principle 
yes, if they are properly targeted and they are able to foster training, innovation, 
certification and access to credit, i.e. those factors that seem to explain the productivity gap 
with larger firms. However, even setting aside crucial issues related to the costs and 
implementation of these policies, expectations should be realistic in that the potential for 
productivity growth through SME policies is limited and could be lower than the effect of 
the same policies not specifically targeted at SMEs, but applied to all firms.  
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Sales: Value of sales reported by firms. Local currency units (LCUs) were converted to 
USD using data on exchange rates from IMF. 
Employment: Total number of permanent and temporary workers. The number of 
temporary workers is weighted by the average length of employment of temporary workers. 
Only LAC countries have information on the length of employment of temporary workers 
Total hours worked per year: 
Labor cost: Labor cost reported by firms. Local currency units (LCUs) were converted to 
USD using data on exchange rates from IMF.   
Material cost: Cost of materials excluding fuel reported by firms. Local currency units 
(LCUs) were converted to USD using data on exchange rates from IMF. 
Capital Stock: Book value of all fixed assets (excluding land). Local currency units 
(LCUs) were converted to USD using data on exchange rates from IMF. 
User cost of capital: It is assumed to be 15% of the capital stock. 
Age: Age of the firm. 
Listed company: Dummy that takes value one if the legal status of the company is listed 
company. 
Sole proprietorship: Dummy that takes value one if the legal status of the company is sole 
proprietorship. 
Partnership: Dummy that takes value one if the legal status of the company is partnership. 
One establishment: Dummy that takes value one if the firm has only one establishment. 
Foreign direct investment: Percentage of foreign capital. 
Direct exports: Percentage of sales exported directly. 
Indirect exports: Percentage of sales exported indirectly. 
Exporting experience: Number of years since the firm exported for the first time. 
Use email: Dummy that takes value one if the firm uses email with its clients and suppliers. 
Use website: Dummy that takes value one if the firm uses a website with its clients and 
suppliers.   27
Manager in bureaucratic issues: Percentage of senior management time in bureaucracy. 
The question in the questionnaire is "In a typical week, what percentage of senior 
management’s time is spent in dealing with requirements imposed by government 
regulations (e.g. taxes, customs, labor regulations, licensing and registration) including 
dealing with officials, completing forms, etc.) 
Credit line: Dummy that takes value one if the establishment has an overdraft facility or 
credit line.  
No competitors: Dummy that takes value one if the firm has no competitors. 
Between one and five competitors: Dummy that takes value one if the firm has between 
one and five competitors. 
More than five competitors: Dummy that takes value one if the firm has more than five 
competitors. 
Capacity utilization: Is the amount of output actually produced relative to the maximum 
amount that could be produced with the existing machinery and equipment and regular 
shifts. It is the average value over the year. 
Use Licensed technology: Dummy establishment uses technology licensed form a foreign 
owned company. 
Product innovation: Dummy in the last three years product innovation. 
Process innovation: Dummy in the last three years process innovation. 
ISO certification: Dummy firm has ISO certification. 
Skilled workers: Percentage of permanent workers that is skilled. 
Non-production workers: Percentage of permanent workers that is non-production. 
Training: Dummy the establishment offer training to its permanent workers. 
Unionized workers: Percentage of workforce unionized.   28
 
 
Figure 1: SME Policy in several LAC countries 
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Figure 4:  The determinants of the productivity gap 
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(a) SME Policy 1 
 
(b) SME Policy 2 
 



















-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Productivity Index (in logs)
No policy, SMEs No policy, Large
Training, SMEs Credit, SMEs












-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Productivity Index (in logs)
No policy, SMEs No policy, Large
Training, SMEs Credit, SMEs
Product Innovation, SMEs All, SMEs  33
     (a)  Training        (b)  Credit 
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Table 1: Size of the MSME sector in Latin America 
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Table 2: Understanding the productivity gap 
 
(a) Regression results 
 
  Discrete size definition    Continuous size definition 
   Restricted Unrestricted     Restricted Unrestricted 
  OLS  OLS  IV 1  IV 2    OLS  OLS  IV 1  IV 2 
                  
Small firms  -0.221***  -0.153***  0.041  0.012    -  -  -  - 
Medium-sized firms  -0.151***  -0.115***  -0.026  -0.036    -  -  -  - 
N. of employees  -  -  -  -   0.060***  0.039***  -0.05  -0.029 
                  
Credit line  -  0.061***  0.327  0.181*   -  0.059*** 0.328  0.177* 
Training -  0.055***  0.212  0.234**    -  0.054***  0.293  0.290** 
ISO Certification  -  0.131***  0.228* 0.221**   - 0.131***  0.437***  0.322*** 
Product Innovation  -  0.000  0.303  0.275**   -  -0.002  0.229  0.230* 
                  
Age (in logs)  0.030***  0.033***  0.030**  0.033***   0.029***  0.033*** 0.033**  0.036*** 
Incorporated Company  0.091***  0.067*  0.037 0.037    0.089***  0.065*  0.023 0.03 
Only one proprietary  -0.138***  -0.133***  -0.107**  -0.119***   -0.130***  -0.128***  -0.112*** -0.121*** 
One establishment  -0.119***  -0.106***  -0.073**  -0.074***   -0.113***  -0.105*** -0.069**  -0.077*** 
Proportion of Unionized 
Workers (C-I-S) 
-0.200* -0.201* -0.265**  -0.262**   -0.142  -0.146  -0.203  -0.198* 
Manager's time in 
bureaucratic issues (C-I-S) 
0.565*** 0.590*** 0.673***  0.668***   0.540** 0.555*** 0.636***  0.621*** 
Capacity Utilization (C-I)  0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011***  0.011***   0.012***  0.011*** 0.010**  0.011*** 
                  
N. of Obs.  7715  7455  7455  7455    7715  7455  7455  7455 
R-squared 0.318  0.33  0.273  0.292   0.318  0.33  0.255  0.283 
Instruments 
  
CI & IS 
average 
CI, IS & CIS 
average      
CI & IS 
average 
CI, IS & CIS 
average 
Sargan (p-value)      2.29 (0.68)  3.43 (0.90)        7.29 (0.12)  9.32 (0.32) 
Inc. Sargan (p-value)        1.14 (0.12)              2.03 (0.27) 
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(b) First Stage Statistics  
 
   IV 1  IV 2 
   Partial R2  F(p-value)  Partial R2  F(p-value) 
       
  Discrete Size 
       
Credit line  0.0114  10.99 (0.000)  0.0306  20.31 (0.000) 
Training  0.0114  10.86 (0.000)  0.0273  20.27 (0.000) 
ISO Certification  0.0301  27.51 (0.000)  0.0689  36.07 (0.000) 
Product 
Innovation  0.0129  11.27 (0.000)  0.0364  21.21 (0.000) 
        
  Continuous Size 
        
Credit line  0.0122  11.56 (0.000)  0.031  20.16 (0.000) 
Training  0.0121  11.71 (0.000)  0.0265  19.38 (0.000) 
ISO Certification  0.032  28.99 (0.000)  0.0687  36.05 (0.000) 
Product 
Innovation  0.0124  10.89 (0.000)  0.0367  21.74 (0.000) 
 
Notes: TBC 
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Table 3: The (potential) impact of SME Policy 
      Treated Control  Diff  S.E.  T-stat 
(a) Training                
All  Unmatched 1.509 1.364 0.145 0.019 7.610 
 ATT  1.509 1.438 0.071 0.026 2.680 
Small  Unmatched 1.424 1.311 0.113 0.025 4.540 
 ATT  1.424 1.318 0.105 0.027 3.950 
Large  Unmatched 1.591 1.610 -0.018 0.035 -0.530 
 ATT  1.591 1.520 0.072 0.042 1.700 
        
(b) Credit Line        
All  Unmatched 1.501 1.304 0.197 0.020 9.790 
 ATT  1.501 1.412 0.089 0.031 2.890 
Small  Unmatched 1.421 1.248 0.173 0.025 7.030 
 ATT  1.421 1.342 0.080 0.035 2.270 
Large  Unmatched 1.607 1.527 0.080 0.038 2.100 
 ATT  1.607 1.496 0.110 0.057 1.950 
        
(c) ISO Certification       
All  Unmatched 1.752 1.376 0.375 0.026 14.530 
 ATT  1.751 1.595 0.156 0.031 4.990 
Small  Unmatched 1.696 1.323 0.373 0.046 8.110 
 ATT  1.696 1.466 0.230 0.048 4.750 
Large  Unmatched 1.776 1.516 0.260 0.032 8.130 
 ATT  1.776 1.653 0.123 0.040 3.110 
        
(d) Product Innovation       
All  Unmatched 1.409 1.538 -0.129 0.022 -5.820 
 ATT  1.409 1.395 0.013 0.035 0.390 
Small  Unmatched 1.310 1.467 -0.158 0.027 -5.900 
 ATT  1.310 1.258 0.052 0.039 1.340 
Large  Unmatched 1.562 1.774 -0.212 0.040 -5.260 
   ATT  1.562 1.635 -0.073 0.069 -1.050 
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Table 4: Simulations – SME Policy vs Non-Targeted by Size Policy 
Percentage of impact explained by 
  
Impact on aggregate 
productivity 
Within-firms Between-firms  Cross-firms 
SME Policy 
Credit 4.7%  15.3%  90.6%  -6.0% 
Training 4.9%  17.8%  86.7%  -4.4% 
Product innovation  5.0%  20.4%  84.9%  -5.3% 
ISO 4.5%  0.0%  100.0%  0.0% 
All 5.7%  45.4%  65.5%  -10.9% 
        
Non-Targeted by Size 
Credit 5.9%  39.7%  66.7%  -6.4% 
Training 6.6%  40.2%  58.9%  0.8% 
Product innovation  6.9%  51.0%  56.3%  -7.3% 
ISO 4.5%  0.8%  99.1%  0.1% 
All 10.5%  81.5%  26.2%  -7.7% 
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Table 5: Total number of observations by country and size 
   Small Medium Large Total
Argentina 276  280 170 726
Bolivia 196  147 58 401
Colombia 329  254 66 649
Mexico 562  348 246 1,156
Panama 120  89 26 235
Peru 147  139 73 359
Paraguay 192  188 46 426
Uruguay 185  156 48 389
Venezuela 177  75 30 282
Chile 205  306 173 684
Ecuador 152  150 85 387
El Salvador  189  166 110 465
Honduras 139  72 50 261
Guatemala 130  125 71 326
Nicaragua 234  110 21 365
Brazil 294  886 455 1,635
Chile (2004)  182  271 235 688
Costa Rica  217  87 39 343
Ecuador (2003)  142  217 80 439
El Salvador (2003)  191  177 97 465
Guatemala (2003)  194  146 95 435
Guyana 85  56 13 154
Honduras (2003)  228  114 108 450
Nicaragua (2003)  288  128 36 452
Peru (2002)  76  33 13 122
      
Total LAC  5,130  4,720 2,444 12,294
 
Note: Some firms do not report the number of employees and therefore it is not possible to construct the size variable. The 
total number of observations is 12,845.   40













Argentina 167 236 67 276  746
Bolivia 123 121 59 106  409
Colombia 154 319 160 16  649
Mexico 158 317 169 517  1,161
Panama 69 22 12 140  243
Peru 120 155 83 3  361
Paraguay 93 63 108 176  440
Uruguay 119 118 122 37  396
Venezuela 72 59 15 137  283
Chile 160 121 74 342  697
Ecuador 105 71 97 121  394
El Salvador  131 139 29 168  467
Honduras 83 39 22 119  263
Guatemala 90 83 15 140  328
Nicaragua 83 28 24 230  365
Brasil 127 721 84 709  1,641
Chile (2004)  215 0 136 337  688
Costa Rica  42 57 0 244  343
Ecuador (2003)  113 97 89 154  453
El Salvador (2003)  114 140 48 163  465
Guatemala (2003)  94 139 32 170  435
Guyana 87 19 5 52  163
Honduras (2003)  116 99 19 216  450
Nicaragua (2003)  84 109 34 225  452
Peru (2002)  37 250 67 199  553
          
Total LAC  2,756 3,522 1,570 4,997  12,845
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Table 7: Testing for Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) 
   Input-output elasticities  F (p-value) 
   Labor Materials  Capital 
Returns to 
scale 
parameter  H0: CRS 
All        
Cost  shares  0.347 0.580  0.073 1.000  - 
Cobb-Douglas  0.393 0.525  0.126 1.044 5.88 (0.015) 
Food and Beverages        
Cost  shares  0.293 0.623  0.084 1.000  - 
Cobb-Douglas  0.402 0.492  0.149 1.043 5.92 (0.015) 
Textiles and Apparels        
Cost  shares  0.399 0.541  0.060 1.000  - 
Cobb-Douglas  0.424 0.473  0.137 1.034 3.72 (0.054) 
Chemicals         
Cost  shares  0.305 0.623  0.071 1.000  - 
Cobb-Douglas  0.390 0.535  0.130 1.055 9.11 (0.002) 
Other manufacturing        
Cost  shares  0.356 0.568  0.076 1.000  - 
Cobb-Douglas  0.345 0.588  0.098 1.032 3.15 (0.076) 
 
Notes: The estimation of the production function of all industries includes size, industry, and country dummies, age (in 
logs), the unionization level (at the CIS level), manager's time dealing with bureaucracy (at the CIS level), capacity 
utilization (at CI level), and dummy variables for listed companies, firms with only one proprietary, firms with only one 
establishment. The equation estimated to obtain the coefficient of each industry is the same plus the interaction between 
inputs and industry dummies. 